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Abstract. Motivated by Generative Adverserial Networks, we study the
computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games
(NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first
proposed with linear payoffs. Extending previous results, we show that
various game theoretic properties of convex-concave two-player zero-sum
games are preserved in this generalization. We then generalize last iterate
convergence results obtained previously in two-player zero-sum games.
We analyze convergence rates when players update their strategies using
Gradient Ascent, and its variant, Optimistic Gradient Ascent, showing
last iterate convergence in three settings — when the payoffs of players
are linear, strongly concave and Lipschitz, and strongly concave and
smooth. We provide experimental results that support these theoretical
findings.
Keywords: Network zero-sum games · Last iterate convergence · Con-
vergence of gradient ascent · Generative adversarial networks.
1 Introduction
Connections between game theory and learning had long been known, before
interest resurged recently in the machine learning community, largely due to
the success of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), a novel framework
for learning generative models [16]. A GAN is formulated as a two-player zero-
sum game between two neural networks, a generator and a discriminator. The
generator attempts to fool the discriminator by mapping random noise to images
that look similar to samples from a target distribution, while the discriminator
learns to distinguish the generator’s output from real samples from the target
distribution. Theoretically, at the equilibrium of this game, the generator outputs
the target distribution. In practice, GANs produce promising results on a number
of tasks including image generation, semantic segmentation, and text-to-image
synthesis [15].
Among many theoretical questions opened up by GANs, that of last iterate
convergence has attracted much attention and seen exciting progress. Classical
? The research was funded by an NSERC Discovery Grant, an NSERC Discovery
Acceleration Grant, and Canadian Research Chair stipend.
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results show that, when players use no-regret online learning algorithms to play
a two-player zero-sum game, the time average of their strategies converge to a
Nash equilibrium — a point where neither player can make gains by unilaterally
deviating from their current strategy. In GANs, strategies correspond to param-
eters of neural networks; averaging strategies makes little sense. It is therefore
desirable that the players’ strategies, from iteration to iteration, should converge
to an equilibrium. This is known as last iterate convergence, which is not implied
by classical results. A number of simple algorithms have been shown to give rise
to such convergence in two-player zero-sum games, with exponential convergence
rates in various settings [14,18,21] (see Section 1.1 for more details).
On the other hand, many recently proposed extensions of GANs go beyond
the two-player zero-sum framework, either to address challenges faced by the
original GAN, or to make it more versatile. In particular, many models introduce
more agents (neural networks) to the game. For example, Hoang et al. [17]
proposed using an ensemble of generators to address mode collapse, a common
problem of the classical GAN, where the generator captures only one or few
modes of the data distribution. Other architectures incorporate a third classifying
network, which is in direct competition with either the generator [22] or the
discriminator [8]; such architectures are often built for semi-supervised learning.
Lastly, some architectures incorporate an additional encoding network which,
like the generator, competes with the discriminator, and allows for sampling
from a latent distribution that encodes additional information about the data
distribution [4,7,12]. Results on two-player zero-sum games do not apply to these
architectures with more than two agents. It is also well known that two-player
zero-sum games have many properties not extensible to games with more players
or non zero-sum payoffs.
We observe that the extensions above all give rise to network zero-sum games
(NZSGs), a class of games first proposed and studied by Cai et al. [5]. An NZSG
is structured by a graph, where each node corresponds to a player, and along
each edge a game is played between its two node players. A player chooses one
strategy to be used in all the games in which which she is engaged; the sum of all
players’ payoffs is always zero. Since players cannot choose different strategies for
different games, an NZSG is not a simple parallelization of multiple two-player
zero-sum games. However, Cai et al. [5] showed that NZSGs with linear payoffs
preserve certain properties from two-player zero-sum games. In particular a Nash
in an NZSG can be computed via a linear program.
We first generalize results of [5] on the tractability of equilibrium for NZSGs
(Section 2); we show that in an NZSG with concave payoffs, a Nash can be
computed via no-regret learning. Then, as our main result, we show last iterate
convergence results for NZSGs with several classes of payoffs (Section 3), when
players adopt simple learning rules used in practice, such as Gradient Ascent (GA)
and Optimistic Gradient Ascent (OGA). GA is the most ubiquitous optimization
algorithm. It may be seen as a smoothed best response, and so it may not be
surprising that it produces dynamics that diverge from the equilibrium in two-
player zero-sum games with linear payoffs [11,18]. We show that this phenomenon
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persists in NZSGs with linear payoffs. OGA, on the other hand, incorporates some
minimal memory, and uses information from one step before. This small tweak
has been shown to induce last iterate convergence in two-player zero-sum games
with either linear payoffs or strongly concave payoffs that are smooth in various
senses [9,18,21]. We extend these to NZSGs, showing comparable convergence
performance. For two-player zero-sum games with strongly concave payoffs, GA
is known to induce last iterate convergence; we generalize this as well.
We use two sets of tools. Our main tool for NZSGs with linear payoffs is
dynamical systems. Strategies played in a repeated game give rise to a dynamical
system; techniques for analyzing such systems naturally can be used to analyze
various update algorithms [10,11,18]. Our results on both the divergence of GA
and convergence of OGA dynamics are built on linear algebraic techniques used
to analyze the corresponding dynamical systems. Crucial to the arguments is an
algebraic property we show for NZSGs; namely, that a Hessian matrix associated
with the payoff functions is antisymmetric everywhere.
We use Lyapunov-style convergence proofs to show results in NZSGs with
strongly concave and smooth payoffs. Apart from existing arguments for two-
player zero-sum games, our proof exploits a structural lemma (Lemma 1), which
may be of independent interest.
In Section 4, we provide experiments that validate our theoretical findings.
1.1 Related Work
Cai et al. [5] introduced the class of network zero-sum games, and showed that a
Nash equilibrium of an NZSG can be computed by a linear programming when
each player’s strategy is a distribution over a finite number of actions.
A few papers study convergence in n-player games. The most closely related
work to ours is Azizian et al. [1]. They show that various gradient-based algorithms,
including OGA, converge at an exponential rate to the Nash in a class of smooth
and “monotone” n-player games. With slight modification explained in the
technical sections, our results on the OGA dynamics in NZSGs with strongly
concave and smooth payoffs or with linear payoffs can be obtained by showing
these games to be smooth and monotone. Our proofs in these settings may be
viewed as alternative approaches to showing these results. An advantage of our
approach is that it is readily modified to apply for games with Lipschitz payoffs,
as we demonstrate in Section 3.3.
Balduzzi et al. [2] study two classes of n-player games, Hamiltonian games
and potential games, both of which are specific instances of NZSGs. They show
that, when players use a continuous-time version of GA to update their strategies
in a Hamiltonian game, the dynamics circle perpetually around the Nash of
the game. They propose Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA) and show it to
converge in last iterate for both Hamiltonian and potential games. Balduzzi et
al. [3] study another class of games called Smooth Market Games, which consist
of payoffs that are pairwise zero-sum. They show that a continuous time version
of GA converges in last iterate to the Nash of a game when payoffs are strictly
concave in players’ strategies.
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A number of papers study last iterate convergence in concave two-player
zero-sum games. Liang and Stokes [18] use tools from dynamical systems to show
exponential convergence of the last iterate in bilinear games when players use
OGA. They also show exponential convergence of the last iterate in games with
smooth and strongly concave payoffs when players use GA. Mokhtari et al. [21]
show exponential convergence of the last iterate in games with bilinear, or smooth
and strongly concave payoffs when the players use OGA, by interpreting OGA as
an approximation of the Proximal Point Method. Gidel et al. [14] use a variational
inequality perspective to show exponential convergence of a variant of OGA in
constrained two-player zero-sum games with smooth and strongly concave payoffs.
Merkitopolous et al. [20] use similar tools to show last iterate, but not exponential
convergence for Mirror Descent and Optimistic Mirror Descent when payoffs are
strongly concave, and for Optimistic Mirror Descent when payoffs are linear.
1.2 Notations and Mathematical Conventions
Vectors in Rk are denoted by boldface, and scalars by lowercase. Time indices are
denoted by superscripts, while players are identified by subscripts. For a square
matrix A we denote the set of its eigenvalues by λ(A). Im denotes the m ×m
identity matrix.
Definition 1. Given U ⊂ Rk, and concave function f : U → R. q ∈ Rk is
a supergradient of f at u if ∀u′ ∈ U , f(u′) ≤ f(u) + 〈q,u′ − u〉. The set of
supergradients of f at a point u is denoted by ∂f(u).
Definition 2. For α > 0, a function f : U → R is α-strongly concave if
∀u,u′ ∈ U and q ∈ ∂f(u),
f(u′) ≤ f(u) + 〈q,u′ − u〉 − α
2
‖u− u′‖2.
A function g : U × V → R is α-strongly concave in u if for any v ∈ V ,
h(u) := g(u,v) is α-strongly concave.
2 Network Zero-sum Games Basics
In this section we extend network zero-sum games as defined by Cai et al. [5] to
allow continuous action spaces. We then show that in games with concave payoff
functions, an equilibrium can be efficiently computed with no-regret dynamics.
Definition 3. A network game G consists of the following:
– a finite set V = {1, ..., n} of players, and a set E of edges which are unordered
pairs of players [i, j], i 6= j;
– for each player i ∈ V , a convex set Xi ⊆ Rdi , the strategy set for player i;
– for each edge [i, j] ∈ E, a two-person game (pij , pji), where pij : Xi×Xj → R,
and pji : Xj ×Xi → R.
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Given a strategy profile x = (x1, ...,xn) ∈
∏
j∈V Xj, player i’s payoff is
pi(x) :=
∑
[i,j]∈E pij(xi,xj).
A network game is a network zero-sum game (NZSG) if for all strategy
profiles x ∈∏j∈V Xj, ∑i∈V pi(x) = 0.
We let X denote
∏
i∈V Xi, and d :=
∑
i∈V di. Two-player zero-sum games
are special cases of NZSGs, where V has two nodes, connected by one edge.
In a concave NZSG, each pij(xi,xj) is concave in xi. An NZSG is linear if
each pij(xi,xj) is linear in both xi and xj .
Let x−i denote the strategy profile without player i’s strategy, i.e., x−i =
(x1, ...,xi−1,xi+1, ...,xn).
Definition 4. A strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equillibrium for an NZSG if for
each player i, for any strategy xi ∈ Xi, pi(x∗) ≥ pi(xi,x∗−i).
It can be shown via a fixed point argument that, in a concave NZSG where
each player’s strategy space Xi is convex and compact, a Nash equilibrium always
exists [19]. Cai et al. [5] showed that for linear NZSGs where each player’s strategy
set is a simplex, a Nash can be computed efficiently by a linear program.
As a warm-up, we show that another classical technique for computing
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, namely, no-regret learning algorithms,
can be used to find an approximate Nash in general concave NZSGs.
Given an NZSG with compact strategy sets, consider the players playing it
repeatedly. Let xsi and x
s
−i denote, respectively, player i’s and the other players’
strategies at time step s of the game. Each player should only respond to the
past strategies of her opponents; i.e., xsi may depend only on x
1
−i, . . . ,x
s−1
−i .
Definition 5. In a repeated game, a player’s regret at time t, ri(t), is
ri(t) = max
xi∈Xi
t∑
s=1
[
pi(xi,x
s
−i)− pi(xsi ,xs−i)
]
.
A player i’s strategy (xsi )s has no-regret if for all t,
1
t ri(t) ≤ (t) for some
(t)→ 0 as t→∞. An algorithm that produces no-regret strategies is a no-regret
algorithm.
It is well known that efficient no-regret algorithms exist [6], and that in a
two-player zero-sum game, if players use no-regret dynamics, the time average of
their strategies converges to a Nash equilibrium [6]. We show this phenomenon
generalizes to NZSGs with concave payoffs.
Proposition 1. In a concave NZSG with compact strategy sets, if each player
uses strategies that have no-regret, then the strategy profile where each player
plays her time-average strategy converges to a Nash equilibrium.
A key step in the proof of Proposition 1 is the following property of NZSGs.
We will make repeated use of this property later in the paper.
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Lemma 1. In an NZSG, for any two strategy profiles x and x∗, we have∑
i
pi(xi,x
∗
−i) = −
∑
i
pi(x
∗
i ,x−i).
As we discussed in the Introduction, Proposition 1 is not adequate for appli-
cations where strategies are parameters of neural networks, since taking averages
over strategies makes little sense in such settings. Following much recent literature,
we shift the focus to last iterate convergence.
3 Last Iterate Convergence in NZSGs
In this section we present our main results on last-iterate convergence in NZSGs
when players use gradient style updates. In this section we assume that the
strategy spaces are unconstrained, i.e., Xi = Rdi for each i.
We first formally define the two update rules we focus on. Recall that we use
xti to denote player i’s strategy at time t. A player using Gradient Ascent (GA)
modifies her strategy by
xt+1i = x
t
i + η∇xipi(xt), (GA)
where η > 0 is a fixed step size. A player using Optimistic Gradient Ascent
(OGA) updates her strategy by
xt+1i = x
t
i + 2η∇xipi(xt)− η∇xipi(xt−1), (OGA)
where η > 0 again is a fixed step size.
3.1 Linear NZSGs
Even in a two-player zero-sum bilinear game, i.e., p1(x1,x2) = −p2(x2,x1) =
p(x1,x2) = x
>
1 Cx2, where C is a d1 × d2 matrix, if each player uses GA, over
time the players’ strategies diverge from the set of Nash [18]. If, instead, players
use OGA, their strategies converge to a Nash of the game [9,18,20]. We show
that these phenomena continue to hold for linear NZSGs.
To state the rates of convergence and divergence, we need to introduce a
matrix H for a linear NZSG, which we motivate later. Given an NZSG and a
strategy profile x, the Hessian H(x) is a d × d block matrix with the (i, j)th
block given by
Hij(x) = ∇2xj ,xipi(x).
Denote the smallest nonzero modulus of an eigenvalue of H by ω(H), and
denote the largest modulus of an eigenvalue of H by ρ(H). Denote the distance
to a set by d(u, S) := mins∈S ‖u− s‖.
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Theorem 1. Consider an unconstrained, linear NZSG. Let X∗ denote the set
of Nash of the game. Assume each player uses GA to update her strategy at each
time step. Assume d(x0, X∗) ≥ R, for some R > 0. Then at each time step t,
d(xt, X∗)2 ≥ (1 + η2ω(H)2)tR2.
Theorem 2. Consider an unconstrained, linear NZSG. Assume that each player
uses OGA as her update rule. Let X∗ denote the set of Nash of the game. If
H(x) is diagonalizable for all x, and if d(x0, X∗) ≤ r, d(x1, X∗) ≤ r for some
r > 0. Then setting η = 1/2ρ(H), at each time step t,
d(xt+1, X∗)2 ≤
1
2
+
1
2
(
1−
(
ω(H)
ρ(H)
)2) 12t r2.
We sketch the proof ideas and relegate details to the supplementary file. We
formulate the behavior of GA and OGA as trajectories of dynamical systems ; this
view has been taken in several previous works, which also analyze the behaviors
of updating algorithms using tools from dynamical systems [10,11,18].
Definition 6. A relation of the form xt+1 = g(xt), also written as x 7→ g(x),
is a discrete time dynamical system with update rule g : Rk → Rk. A point z is a
fixed point of g if g(z) = z.
If players use GA, the strategies evolve according to the dynamical system
xt+1 = (Id + ηH)x
t, where H is the Hessian matrix defined above. It is not hard
to show that the set of Nash equilibria is precisely the set of fixed points of this
dynamical system. Note that, when g is a linear function, as is the case for the
GA dynamics, a point is its fixed point if and only if it is in the eigenspace of g
for eigenvalue 1.
For a dynamical system with update rule g : Rk → Rk, the Jacobian is the
matrix with its (i, j)-th entry Jij =
∂gi
∂xj
. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian J at a
fixed point z describe the behavior of the dynamics around z . Roughly speaking,
if all eigenvalues of J have modulus greater than 1, then in a neighborhood
around z, the dynamics diverges from z; conversely, if all eigenvalues of J have
modulus smaller than 1, in a neighborhood of z the dynamics converges to z.
When g is linear, this characterization of convergence/divergence extends to the
entire space (beyond neighborhoods around z), and allows some eigenvalues to
be 1.
Proposition 2. Let Z denote the set of fixed points of a dynamical system with
linear update rule: g(z) = Jz, where J is diagonalizable. Let d(x, Z) denote
minz∈Z ‖x− z‖.
(a) If ∀λ ∈ λ(J) either |λ| < 1 or λ = 1, then letting σmax<1(J) denote the
largest modulus of any eigenvalue of J not equal to 1, ∀x0 ∈ X, d(xt+1, Z) ≤
(σmax<1(J))
td(x0, Z).
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(b) If ∀λ ∈ λ(J) either |λ| > 1 or λ = 1, then letting σmin>1(J) denote the
smallest modulus of any eigenvalue of J not equal to 1, ∀x0 ∈ X, d(xt+1, Z) ≥
(σmin>1(J))
td(x0, Z).
To show Theorem 1, therefore, it suffices to analyze the eigenvalues of the
matrix J = Id + ηH. The crucial observation is that, for NZSGs, the Hessian H
is an antisymmetric matrix of the form
H =

0 C12 . . . C1n
−C>12 0 . . . C2n
...
...
. . .
...
−C>1n −C>2n . . . 0
 .
This is a consequence of the following lemma on NZSGs in general:
Lemma 2. In an NZSG, if each pi has continuous second partial derivatives,
then
∇2xi,xjpji(x) = −(∇2xj ,xipij(x))>.
As a result, for the GA dynamics in a linear NZSG, all eigenvalues of H are
imaginary, and therefore all the eigenvalues of Id + ηH are of the form 1 + iηλ
for some λ ∈ R. Part (b) of Proposition 2 indicates a diverging dynamics.
The antisymmetry of the Hessian H is also a crucial step in the proof of
Theorem 2. We first need to augment the state space to allow the memory from
a previous step to be passed as part of the state. Following Daskalakis and
Panageas [11], we consider a dynamical system with the following update rule
g : R2d → R2d, defining pˆi(x,x′) := pi(x):
g(x,x′) = (g1(x,x′), g2(x,x′)), (1)
g1i (x,x
′) = xi + 2η∇xi pˆi(x,x′)− η∇x′i pˆi(x,x′),
g2i (x,x
′) = xi.
More explicitly, for the OGA update rule, we have the relation (xt+1,xt) =
g(xt,xt−1). We make use of a connection established by [11] between the GA
dynamics and the OGA dynamics (Proposition 3). Besides another application
of the antisymmetry of H, we also use an expression for the determinant of a
2× 2 block matrix (Lemma 3).
Proposition 3 ([11]). Let z be a fixed point of the GA dynamics. Then, (z, z)
is a fixed point of the OGA dynamics, and for each µ ∈ λ(JGA) we have two
eigenvalues in λ(JOGA) that are the roots of the quadratic equation
λ2 − (2µ− 1)λ+ (µ− 1) = 0.
Lemma 3 ([13]). Let A be a block matrix of the following form
A =
[
M1 M2
M3 M4
]
,
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where each Mi is a square matrix, and M4 is invertible. Then the determinant of
A is equal to the determinant of its Schur Complement:
det(A) = det(M1 −M2(M4)−1M3) det(M4).
In order to be able to apply Proposition 2, we make an additional diag-
onalizability assumption on H. This is not a restrictive assumption; for any
linear function, there is an arbitrarily small perturbation that makes its Hessian
diagonalizable; in fact, the set of nondiagonalizable matrices over C has Lebesgue
measure 0. In comparison, Azizian et al. [1] show exponential convergence of
OGA in linear games with the assumption that the Hessian is invertible.
3.2 Smooth and Strongly Concave Payoffs
A payoff function pij is said to be β-smooth, for β > 0, if for all xi,x
′
i ∈
Xi,xj ,x
′
j ∈ Xj ,
‖∇xipij(xi,xj)−∇xipi(x′i,xj)‖ ≤ β‖xi − x′i‖; (2)
‖∇xipij(xi,xj)−∇xipi(xi,x′j)‖ ≤ β‖xj − x′j‖.
An NZSG is said to have β-smooth payoffs if each payoff function pij is
β-smooth for every [i, j] ∈ E. The game is said to be have α-strongly concave
payoffs if each pi is α-strongly concave in xi. In this section, we show that when
players use GA and OGA to update their strategies in a game with payoffs that
are α-strongly concave and β-smooth, their strategies converge to a Nash at an
exponential rate. Throughout this section, we assume that for each player i, pi is
twice continuously differentiable. Since each pi is differentiable, it has a unique
supergradient, ∇xipi(x) at a point x.
Before stating our main results, we remark on the existence and uniqueness
of Nash. Since we consider unconstrained NZSGs, Proposition 1 does not apply.
Unlike linear NZSGs in Section 3.1, where x = 0 is always a Nash, in general,
Nash may not exist when the strategy spaces are not compact. With α-strong
concavity, however, we do get uniqueness of Nash when one exists.
Lemma 4. In an NZSG with α-strongly concave payoffs for α > 0, if a Nash
equilibrium exists, it is unique.
For applications such as GANs, where strategies are parameters of neural
networks, strategy spaces are practically compact, and a Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed by Proposition 1 to exist.
We now state the main results of this section.
Theorem 3. Consider an unconstrained NZSG with payoffs that are twice con-
tinuously differentiable, α-strongly concave and β-smooth for α, β > 0. Assume
the existence of a Nash, x∗. Let x0 ∈ X be such that ∀i ∈ V, ‖x0i − x∗i ‖ ≤ r for
r > 0. If each player uses GA, with η = α2nβ2 , then at each time step t,∑
i
‖xti − x∗i ‖2 ≤
(
1− α
2
4nβ2
)t
nr2.
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Theorem 4. Consider an unconstrained NZSG with payoff functions that are
twice continuously differentiable, α-strongly concave and β-smooth, for α, β >
0. Assume the existence of a Nash, x∗. Let x0,x1 ∈ X be such that ∀i ∈
V, ‖x0i − x∗i ‖ ≤ r, ‖x1i − x∗‖ ≤ r for r > 0. If each player uses OGA, with
η = 12nβ , then at each time step t,
∑
i
‖xt+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤
(
1− α
4nβ
)t
(n+ 1)2r2.
In order show convergence for GA, we use a Lyapunov-style convergence
argument. For two-player zero-sum games with strongly-concave and smooth
payoffs, Liang and Stokes [18] show that, when players use GA to update their
strategies, the strategies converge to the Nash of the game at an exponential rate.
The key that allows us to extend the result to NZSGs is Lemma 1, which causes
terms that are introduced by the strong concavity condition to vanish.
For the OGA update rule, we make use of writing OGA as a two step update,
so that the second iterate results in a GA style update,
wti = w
t−1
i + η∇xipi(xt), (OGA′)
xt+1i = w
t
i + η∇xipi(xt).
Plugging in for wti,w
t−1
i in terms of x
t
i,x
t−1
i gives us the original OGA update.
Mokhtari et al. [21] show that in a two-player zero-sum game with smooth
and strongly concave payoffs, if each player uses the OGA update, the strategies
converge to a Nash exponentially fast. Lemma 1 again plays a key role in our
extension of the result to network zero-sum games.
Azizian et al. [1] show exponential convergence to a Nash when players use the
OGA update strategy in a game with smooth payoffs and “strongly monotone”
dynamics. We show in the supplementary file that NZSGs with strongly concave
payoffs are in fact strongly monotone; this constitutes an alternative derivation
of exponential convergence of the OGA dynamics.
3.3 Lipschitz and Strongly Concave Payoffs
In this section, we show that if players use GA or OGA to update their strategies
in an NZSG where payoffs are α-strongly concave and L-Lipschitz, for α,L > 0,
then, given appropriate step sizes, their strategies converge to the unique Nash
of the game. We assume that for each player i, pi is continuously differentiable.
If each pi is L-Lipschitz, then for each player i,
∀x ∈ X, ‖∇xipi(x)‖ ≤ L. (3)
Theorem 5. Consider an unconstrained NZSG that is played for T rounds.
Assume each pi is α-strongly concave in Xi and L-Lipschitz for α,L > 0. Assume
the existence of a Nash, x∗. Let x0i be such that, for each player i, ‖x0i − x∗i ‖ ≤ r
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for r > 0. If each player uses GA with variable step size ηs > 0 at each time
step s, then at each time step t,
∑
i
‖xti − x∗i ‖2 ≤ L2n
t∑
s=1
η2s + nr
2
t∏
s=1
(1− ηsα) .
In particular, if ηs = T
−(0.5+) for  ∈ (0, 0.5), then
lim
T→∞
∑
i
‖xTi − x∗i ‖2 = 0.
Theorem 6. Consider an unconstrained NZSG that is played for T rounds.
Assume each pi is α-strongly concave in Xi and L-Lipschitz for α,L > 0. Assume
the existence of a Nash, x∗. Let x0i be such that for each player i, ‖x0i − x∗i ‖ ≤ r
for r > 0. Then if each player uses OGA with nonincreasing step size ηs > 0,
∑
i
‖xti − x∗i ‖2 ≤ 4nL2
t∑
s=1
ηsηs−1 + nr2
t∏
s=1
(1− (ηs + ηs−1)α).
In particular, if ηs = T
−(0.5+) for  ∈ (0, 0.5), then
lim
T→∞
∑
i
‖xTi − x∗i ‖2 = 0.
Our proofs for these theorems resemble those from Section 3.2, with Lemma 1
facilitating the generalization to NZSGs. We note that the proof fails to achieve
exponential convergence, due to the lack of smoothness in the game. Furthermore,
the algorithm designer needs to know in advance the time horizon T , the number
of time steps the game is to be played, in order to choose a learning schedule
that allows for guaranteed last-iterate convergence.
4 Experiments
In this section, we provide examples validating our results. We first show con-
vergence in the simplest setting — a game with three players where a zero-sum
game is played between each pair. We provide experiments showing convergence
in a game with linear payoffs, and a game with smooth and strongly concave
payoffs. We then provide an experiment showing the effect that increasing the
number of players has on convergence rate. For each experiment, we show the
performance of both GA and OGA.
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4.1 Three Player Game with Linear Payoffs
(a) GA (b) OGA
Fig. 1: In the linear game, GA last iterate diverges, while GA average iterate
converges. For OGA, both last and average iterate converge.
We provide experiments validating our theoretical results for a three player game
with linear payoffs. The payoff of the players can be expressed asp1(x)p2(x)
p3(x)
 = [x>1 x>2 x>3 ]
 0 C12 C13−C>12 0 C23
−C>13 −C>23 0
x1x2
x3
 .
To track convergence, it is convenient if the game has a unique Nash. The
linear game will have a unique Nash at 0 as long as the fixed point of dynamics is
the singleton {0}. This will occur if the Hessian of payoffs, H, has no eigenvalues
equal to 0. Since H is antisymmetric, its eigenvalues come in complex pairs, and
if d is even dimension, H will have an eigenvalue equal to 0 if its determinant is
0. If we sample entries of the Ci’s i.i.d from the uniform distribution this will
happen with probability 0.
We let Cij ∈ R10×10, and initialize the entries by sampling i.i.d. from the
uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We initialize the coordinates of x01,x
0
2,x
0
3 i.i.d from
the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. For GA we set η = 0.003, to allow us to
visualize the convergence of the average iterate and the divergence of the last
iterate on the same plot. For OGA we let η = 0.05 for fastest convergence. We
plot the trajectory of a single representative game simulation.
We demonstrate the performance of GA and OGA by plotting the trajectories
of players’ strategies; to show this in R3, we take the `2-norm of each player’s
strategies to form a three dimensional vector. We also plot the the sum of the
squares of the `2 distance of player strategies from the origin on a log scale. This
is shown in Figure 1. From our results, it can be seen that GA diverges from
the unique Nash of the game, while OGA converges to the unique Nash in last
iterate. Notice that although the last iterate of OGA converges, it does so at a
slower speed than the average iterate. The convergence in last iterate of OGA is
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not quite linear, but is upper bounded by a linear function, and hence does not
contradict our theory.
4.2 Three Player Game with Smooth and Strongly Concave Payoffs
(a) GA (b) OGA
Fig. 2: In the smooth and strongly concave game, last iterate and average iterate
converges for both algorithms.
We next provide experiments showing convergence in a three player game with
smooth and strongly concave payoffs. We set the payoffs for each player as follows:
pij(x) = −1
2
‖xi‖2 + x>i Cijxj +
1
2
‖xj‖2 (4)
pi(x) =
∑
j∈V \{i}
pij(x)
Like in the game with linear payoffs, this game has a unique Nash at 0 if and
only if the determinant of H is nonzero, which we can guarantee by sampling
entries of the Ci’s uniformly at random.
As in the linear game, we initialize the entries of Cij ∈ R10×10 by sampling
i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and the coordinates of x01,x
0
2,x
0
3
i.i.d from the uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. We set η = 0.005 for both GA and
OGA. The results are shown in Figure 2.
From our plots, it can be seen that both GA and OGA last iterates converge
for the smooth and strongly concave game. Although OGA converges for both
the game with linear payoffs and the game with smooth and strongly concave
payoffs, the trajectory of GA and OGA take a more direct path to the Nash
in the smooth and strongly concave game, as can be seen in the 3d trajectory.
Furthermore, the last iterate of both GA and OGA follow a linear trend in the
log scale, as predicted by our theory.
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4.3 Effect of Number of Players on Convergence
Fig. 3: In the smooth and strongly concave game, the performance of GA decays
as players increase, while the performance of OGA plateaus.
In this section, we provide experimental results showing the effect of varying n in
a NZSG of n players. For the smooth and strongly concave game, our theoretical
upper bound has a linear dependence on the number of players in the game for
both GA and OGA, and thus we test the dependence on players only in this
setting.
We study a game with smooth and strongly concave payoffs, using the same
payoffs as in Section 4.2 (see Equation (4)). We perform the same initializations
as in Section 4.2 - initializing the entries of Cij ∈ R10×10 by sampling i.i.d. from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and the coordinates of x0i i.i.d from the uniform
distribution on [−1, 1]. We set η = 0.001 for both GA and OGA. We let the
number of players range from 3 to 100, plotting convergence for each setting of
players. We track convergence by plotting the number of iterates it takes for the
the sum of the squares of the `2 distance of player strategies from the origin
to dip below 0.00001. For each fixed number of players, we run ten trials to
convergence and plot the average. The results are shown in Figure 3.
From this plot, we can see that the number of players affects the convergence
rate of GA. However, for OGA, the effect of players on convergence disappears
after enough players are introduced into the game. This suggests that the conver-
gence rate for OGA in the smooth and strongly concave case may not be tight.
This is an open question for future research.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the convergence of player strategies to equilibria in
Network Zero-sum Games, a class of games that generalizes two-player zero-sum
games and arises naturally in learning architectures that extend GANs. We show
that many results in two-player zero-sum games on the convergence and diver-
gence of these algorithms extend to NZSGs. We believe these results may guide
practitioners working on extensions of GANs that involve more than two agents.
Our results also shed some light on why existing extensions of GANs that employ
more than two agents are successful in achieving convergent behaviour. Future
research may search for models with more relaxed game theoretic assumptions
where convergence can still be shown for reasonable algorithms. For example,
the zero-sum assumption is absent from certain successful architectures, e.g.
Wasserstein-GAN with Gradient Penalty [23].
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